Despite overwhelming scientific evidence for man-made climate change, many people remain skeptical. While this phenomenon of 'climate-skepticism' prevents implementation of environmental policies around the globe, it is ignored in economic models of climate change. In this paper we fill this gap by modeling policymakers with varying levels of skepticism facing a climate change catastrophe. We calculate optimal emission and consumption paths for various levels of belief in man-made climate change to explore the true cost of climate skepticism. Our findings are as follows. First of all we find that when facing catastrophic climate change even a completely skeptic policy (believing there is zero probability that climate change is connected to CO2 emissions) will not lead to unbounded climate change and emissions. Second, we find there is still a significant loss due to climate-change resulting from skepticism if emission-driven climate change is real. Lastly, we find that moderate levels of skepticism will still lead to significant cuts in greenhouse gas emissions.
Introduction
Man-made climate change is an example of an externality, where actions of individual agents result in loss of utility for the entire society. However, the problem of climate change is special because despite overwhelming scientific evidence that supports it, a significant portion of the population does not believe climate change is man-made. In this paper we describe this phenomenon as climate-skepticism, defining it as a belief that while climate change may occur it is not caused by human activity. A prime example of climate skepticism is a statement by Mitt Romney, the republican nominee for the U.S.
presidency, who said in 2012: "My view is that we do not know what is causing climate change on this planet. And the idea of spending trillions and trillions of dollars to try to reduce CO2 emissions is not the right course for us." Climate skepticism has been a steady presence in our society, hampering implementation of stringent environmental policy.
Because climate skepticism is so prevalent it is important to understand its consequences. Given the overwhelming scientific evidence, climate change is most likely driven by human activity. Does that mean that climate skeptic policies lead to uncontrolled climate change? Can we assign a monetary cost to climate skepticism? If the cost is very large, then maybe more resources should be invested into convincing the population that climate change is emission-driven. Since most of the world's governments are democratically elected, a less skeptic population would result in a less skeptic policymaker. On the other hand, with climate-skepticism so prevalent we must consider a possibility however unlikely that the skeptics are right. What is the true cost of a stringent environmental policy (from a skeptic's point of view)?
The purpose of this paper is to explore these problems in a formal theoretical framework. The main contribution of this paper is formally accounting for the skepticism of a policy-maker in a fully calibrated general equilibrium model with catastrophic climate change damages. Within our model we quantify the level of climate skepticism as the probability the policy-maker assigns to climate change being random rather than emission-driven.
While very few papers explicitly introduce climate change skepticism, our paper contributes to a larger field of literature modeling structural uncertainty about climate change. The works in this field consider optimal policies in face of uncertainty about true values of climate change parameters. A simple way to study structural uncertainty is the 'sensitivity analysis' approach, using a deterministic model like DICE (Nordhaus, 1992) and sampling the input parameters from prior distributions (formed based on expert opinions). For each sample the model is simulated resulting in a distribution of carbon cost that reflects uncertainty about climate change (see Schauer (1995) , and Nordhaus and Popp (1997) , Stern (2007) ). The expected values of these carbon cost distributions were found to be much higher than in the certainty case, resulting in more stringent policy recommendations. Most of these early studies do not include uncertainty in their optimization. One exception is (Pizer, 1999) which solved the model with uncertainty included, finding that optimal policies that maximize expected utility are much more stringent than those optimal for the certainty equivalent case.
This simple approach is fairly limited as it requires us to assume a distribution for each climate change parameter. However, there are still deep uncertanties about climate changes that cannot be modeled using this approach. As a result, more recent studies have adopted more sophisticated approaches. Weitzman (2009) used fat-tail distributions of climate parameters to demonstrate that under 'deep uncertainty' about climate change, cost-benefit analysis of emissions policies is impossible. Pindyck (2012) models uncertainty about future temperature with flexible distributions of climate damages finding that uncertainty about temperature influences Willingness to Pay (WTP) for climate change more than higher expected values. Hennlock (2009) uses prior distributions similar to earlier studies, but introduces ambiguity aversion (finding the optimal policy for reducing the damage in the worst-case scenario rather than maximizing expected utility). Crost and Traeger (2011) focuses on uncertainty in climate damages, introducing uncertainty in every period rather than ex-ante, and breaking down the effect of uncertainty into risk aversion and inter-temporal sustainability. Just like the studies using the simpler approach to uncertainty, all of the studies mentioned above, concur that more uncertainty leads to more stringent optimal environmental policy. One exception to that is Athanassoglou and Xepapadeas (2012) who find that emissions can increase with uncertainty, but only if damage control (adaptation) technology is very advanced.
A common feature of climate models dealing with uncertainty, that is somewhat related to modeling climate skepticism, is learning. Models that allow for learning, focus on the question whether it is best to reduce emissions now or wait until more is known about climate change. The option of 'waiting until we know more' is similar to the arguments of skeptics like Mitt Romney mentioned earlier. Most of these studies focus on learning about 'climate sensitivity' -how far temperature rises due to an increase in greenhouse gas emissions. Kelly and Kolstad (1999) consider a model where the true value of climate sensitivity is unknown, but can be pinned down over time through Bayesian learning. Their model is fairly complex, and they solve it using numerical methods very similar to the ones used in our paper. They find that it will take many years to resolve the uncertainty about climate sensitivity, leading to many years of suboptimal decisions. Leach (2007) extends these results by allowing for uncertainty and learning about both climate sensitivity and the persistence of greenhouse gas accumulation, finding that learning takes too long and leads to long-term inefficient policies. van Wijnbergen and Willems (2012) is the paper that is closest to our work, which actually explicitly models climate-skepticism in the context of learning about climate change. The study concludes that climate skeptics have an incentive to reduce emissions, as emission reduction will facilitate learning about the nature of climate change. The study cites irreversibly as the reason: learning through emitting less is better than learning through emitting more. Our study differs from van Wijnbergen and Willems (2012) as we study skepticism in the context of a fully calibrated general equilibrium model. On the other hand in our model the policy maker's level of skepticism is constant and can't be reduced or increased through Bayesian learning.
Most of the literature on climate change uncertainty focuses on the possibility of more severe (rapid or disastrous) climate change than is generally expected. It is thus usually concluded that uncertainty leads to a more drastic optimal environmental policy.
Our study seeks to add to this literature by going against this trend, focusing on a potentially weaker connection between climate change in emissions. Uncertainty in our study manifests itself as skepticism -perception of climate change as a potentially random and uncontrollable phenomenon. Many environmental papers do implicitly consider a fully skeptic policy maker. The frequently used DICE model (Nordhaus, 2008) , uses a Business as Usual scenario to represent the consequences of not doing anything about climate change (the completely climate skeptic case). It is usually assumed that in such a case, emissions will grow at the same rate as they have over the past years. Our study takes a more complex approach to the problem of skepticism. First of all, our analysis goes beyond the completely skeptic policy maker. We explore what the optimal policy is for a partially skeptic policy maker, who believes that climate change may be exogenous but only with a certain probability. Secondly, our model contains a more complex damage specification which makes even the problem of a completely skeptic policy maker less straightforward.
This paper considers the case of catastrophic damage induced by abrupt climate change. The onset of the abrupt catastrophic event is uncertain, but its probability distribution is known. The catastrophe probability function is increasing in temperature.
This damage specification was used because it makes the fully skeptic policymaker's problem non-trivial. An abrupt climate catastrophe results in non-linear dynamics affecting the policymaker's consumption and savings decisions even if he does not believe he can control climate change through emissions. Furthermore, as stated by Weitzman (2009)'s 'dismal theorem' any cost-benefit analysis of climate change is incomplete without considering the lower-bound of damages (the worst possible scenario). Hence the climate catastrophic event we use drives mankind to some very low subsistence-level of consumption, drastically reducing the marginal productivity of capital. Two examples of such catastrophes are an abrupt rise in sea level or an explosive outburst of diseases resulting from a climate shift. One key assumption about the damage specification that drives our results is that post-catastrophic consumption levels are independent of the capital prior to catastrophe. The damage specification we use is similar to the one used by Tsur and Zemel (2008) , Tsur and Zemel (2009) , Karp and Tsur (2011) and Tsur and Withagen (2011) 1 . In particular Tsur and Zemel (2008) Lemoine and Traeger (2012) ), where the nature of climate damages changes after temperature exceeds some (unknown) threshold value. While we do not explicitly model threshold effects some of the dynamics we get are fairly similar to those found in these studies.
Our results are three fold. First, we find that when potential damages are catastrophic, even a completely climate-skeptic policy does not result in unbounded climate change. A potential catastrophe causes the policy-maker to fear he will soon switch to a subsistencelevel. With no adaptation, capital is useless after the catastrophe occurs so capital is depleted, leading to a scale-back of the economy. This in turn leads to fewer emissions resulting in a slowdown in temperature increase. Second, we find that the additional long-run increase in temperature resulting from a fully skeptic policy is over 5 degrees Celsius (compared to an increase of 1.5 degree under the optimal climate-aware policy).
Third, we find that moderate skepticism (a belief that climate change may be man-made but isn't necessarily) leads to emission cuts that are still fairly stringent as full climate change awareness. The catastrophic consequences of climate change provide sufficient incentives to cut emissions even to someone who attaches a small probability to man made climate change. Thus even a policy-maker who believes there is a 10 percent chance that climate change is man-made will prefer to cut emissions by over 50 percent leading to a temperature increase of just 3 degrees Celsius.
The rest of our paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 outlines the components of the integrated assessment model. Section 3 characterizes the three optimal policy problems (completely skeptic, climate-aware, and moderately skeptic) and describes the solution method used to solve them. Section 4 presents the optimal policies, simulations of the economy, and welfare analysis for all cases. Section 5 concludes.
Model
We are interested in the global environmental and economic outcomes from a climateskeptic and climate-aware policy maker/social optimizer. While in reality the policy is implemented via global agreements on emission standards and implemented by each individual national government for simplicity we use a representative agent model, as if a global policy maker can set global consumption and CO 2 emissions directly. To make modeling uncertainty easier we use a discrete-time infinite-horizon model.
In the economy, output is produced with capital K and fossil fuel energy X. The production function F (K, X) has decreasing returns to scale. Capital depreciates at rate δ while fossil fuel has extraction cost p per unit of energy. Consumers own firms and consume C resulting in the inter temporal resource constraint:
Emissions from fossil-fuel consumption increase CO 2 concentration concentration according to the following law of motion:
where S is CO 2 concentration, e is amount of CO 2 emissions per unit of fossil fuel energy and S b is the pre-industrial level of CO 2 concentration. CO 2 concentration depreciates through absorption at rate γ, and . This is of course just an approximation to the three-reservoir carbon stock system used by Nordhaus. We will discuss this simplification further when we calibrate the model with numerical parameter values.
The two expressions above are fairly common to integrated assessment models. The model ing of climate change expectations is where our model differs. Expectations of future temperature are conditional on the skepticism of the policy maker. A completely climate-aware policy maker (no skepticism) believes that CO 2 concentration affects the global temperature through radiative forcing. This process is represented by the following law of motion:
where T is global temperature, β defines climate sensitivity and is the stochastic component. The climate sensitivity (equal in this case to β/(1 − α) measures the magnitude of the radiative forcing mechanism on temperature. The true value of climate sensitivity is hard to quantify due to the complexity of the carbon cycle. Nevertheless environmental economists utilize this concept to simplify their models. In addition to the climate-aware policy maker, we also introduce a climate-skeptic policy maker, who believes with a certain probability that temperature is random, represented by the following simple auto-regressive process:
There are many ways to model skeptic expectations of temperature, we use a simple AR(1) process mostly to make the computation easy. In order to reconcile such skeptic expectations with a rise of .75 degrees that the planet has experienced we pick φ so that it is very close to 1. This makes the shock to temperature highly persistent making a big rise in temperature probable under the skeptic scenario. We model the level of skepticism a policymaker has by the parameter π SK -the probability that the random climate change scenario is the true one according to the policy maker's beliefs. Thus the general expression for the policy-maker's expectation of climate change is:
We model climate change damages as a catastrophic event that occurs as a result of a shift in temperature. A real analogue of this catastrophe could be a change in the gulfstream current or a rapid rise of the sea level. Another way a catastrophe could manifest itself could be runaway climate change as a result of the melting of Greenland's ice cap.
As a result of the meltdown vast quantities of green house gases are released, resulting in ever-increasing temperatures. After the catastrophe occurs the world switches to a subsistence economy -where each period a small valueC is consumed. Then the value of social welfare after the catastrophe occurs is:
where U (C) is the consumer's utility function and ρ is the discount factor. A key assumption made in constructing climate damages in this way is that capital accumulated prior to the catastrophe is irrelevant in the post-catastrophic world. A more realistic way would be to model the climate catastrophe as a drastic reduction in the productivity factor. However that would make the problem much more complex (endogenizing the continuation value), making it less tractable. The extent to which this simplifying assumption drives our results will be discussed further, when we describe our results in Section 4.
Assuming the catastrophe occurs at time t 1 , then the expression for social welfare is:
However the timing of the catastrophe is uncertain and endogenous, increasing with temperature. What is known to the policymaker is λ(T ) -the survival probability. This is the probability that no catastrophe occurs for every possible value of T . (This is often used to model catastrophic climate change (see Tsur and Zemel (2008) and others). Thus the resulting expression for expected social welfare is:
The intuition behind the expression above is the following. At each period t social welfare is equal to utility of consumption plus the subsistence consumption level for all future periods if catastrophe occurs. This welfare is then multiplied the probability that catastrophe does not occur before t (equal to t−1 j=1 λ(T j )).
Solving for Optimal Policy
In this section we outline the path to solving the optimal policy problem. We first solve the problem of optimal consumption and fossil fuel use for the extreme cases: the completely climate-skeptic policy maker (π SK = 0) and a completely climate-aware one (π SK = 1). The problem of a moderately skeptic policy maker(0 < π SK < 1) is similar to that of a climate-aware one thus we don't describe that solution method separately.
Skeptic Policymaker
We solve the problem of the fully skeptic policymaker by assuming that climate change is random. Recall however, that while such a policymaker perceives temperature to be exogenous he is still aware of the potential of a climate catastrophe that occurs with a probability λ(T ). To solve the fully skeptic policy-maker's problem we must maximize social welfare in (2.8) subject to constraints (2.1), and (2.4). (constraint (2.2) is irrelevant to the fully skeptic policy maker as a change CO 2 concentration does not lead to any consequences as far as he is concerned). Since T t is an exogenous stochastic process, the problem becomes a typical Ramsey problem with a twist randomly varying discount factor. This problem leads us to the following conditions that the optimal solution must follow.
The first condition is the Euler equation, requiring the current marginal utility of consumption to be the same as the discounted marginal utility of investment. The second condition requires the marginal productivity of fossil-fuels to be equal to the fossil-fuel price.
In order to solve for the optimal skeptic policy we need to specify functional forms for utility, production and survival probability functions. They are as follows:
Where η, κ, ω, τ, and υ are all parameters. The CRRA utility function and Cobb-Douglas production function are fairly standard for macroeconomic models . There was no precedent however for survival probability function λ. Though Tsur and Zemel (2008) models the climate change catastrophe in a similar fashion, that study is focused on the long-run equilibrium and thus does not need to specify a functional form. We chose the functional form in (3.5) because it is between 0 and 1 for all values of T and is monotonically decreasing in T . This is logical as survival probability should decrease with climate change (as probability of a climate catastrophe increases.)
Substituting the utility and production functions defined in (3.3) and (3.4) into the equations above, we arrive at the Euler equation for the skeptic policy-maker:
We could not obtain a closed-form solution for C that satisfies (3.6), so we solved the problem numerically using projection analysis. The parameter values used for the numerical solution are presented in Table 1 . For more details on the projection method and the way we implemented it, see the description in Appendix A.
Climate Aware Policymaker
The next step is to solve for the optimal behavior of a non-skeptic policy maker. To do so we must maximize (2.8) under constraints (2.1) -(2.3). The Lagrangian for this problem is as follows:
where
The first order conditions (presented below) are more complex than the ones we obtained in the skeptic case:
T t are shadow prices of capital, atmospheric CO 2 stock and temperature respectively . Unlike the skeptic, the climate-aware policymaker is aware of the link between emissions and catastrophic climate change. Hence, the catastrophe probability λ is endogenous to the policy-maker's decision, resulting in an endogenous-discounting mechanism described in Tsur and Zemel (2008) . With the discount-rate endogenous, next period value of all future consumption V t+2 becomes endogenous in the first order conditions. Because of this we cannot simplify the first order conditions much further.
Therefore we use the value function iteration method to solve this problem. We follow the algorithm outlined in Kelly and Kolstad (2001), specifically well-suited for solving integrated assessment models with an infinite horizon. The Bellman equation for the problem is:
Note that once we know the true expression for V , finding the optimal control variables is fairly straightforward -just solving a constrained optimization problem. We use a neural-network approximation to V and a Newton-Rhapson algorithm to find the best approximation. Then once we know the value of V we use a Sequential Quadratic Programming algorithm to find the optimal C and X at every point in time and simulate the economy. For a more detailed description of the algorithm see Appendix A.2. 
Calibration
Similar to many environmental economic studies, we calibrate the model so that one period is equal to 10 years. For many parameters we use the same calibration as in Rezai et al. (2012) due to similarity between the models (differing only in price of oil and damage specification). Discount factor ρ is set to 0.9 corresponding to roughly 0.96%
annual rate of pure time preference. The rate of inter temporal substitution η is 2.
Production Parameters
The marginal output elasticity of capital κ is set to .35. We set the rate of decay of capital to .5 which corresponds to about 6.7% annually. We then use current global economic data (source: the World Bank) to calibrate the rest of the parameters. Current capital stock is K 0 = 2(US $100 Trillion), and energy consumption over the past decade is X 0 = 1.1 (100 Trillion kg of oil equivalent). Global GDP over the past decade is 
Climate Parameters
The initial CO2 concentration S 0 is set to 388 ppmv (NOAA, 2010), while the preindustrial level S b is set to 281 ppmv. We take a barrel of oil to be equivalent to 1/10 ton carbon and 2.13 gigaton carbon (GtC) to be equivalent to 1 part per million by volume CO2. This results in e = 36.6 (parts per million per 100 kg of oil equivalent). For the parametrization of the carbon cycle we follow Kelly and Kolstad (1999) setting α = .658 and β = 1.47. There is no precedent in literature for calibrating the survival probability λ. We calibrate λ so that the initial probability of a climate catastrophe is .1% and that it will reach 50 percent when temperature rises to 10 degrees Celsius (setting τ = 10 and υ = 1.45). We assume a rather grim catastrophic scenario for climate change (following Weitzman (2009) dismal theorem that the lower bound of climate damages influences the cost-benefit analysis the most). Under our scenario 50 percent of the world population is destroyed and the rest switches to subsistence consumption of $2 a day, leading to consumption of $20 Trillion per decade (i.e.C = .2).
Steady State
Before we present the optimal policy solutions and dynamic simulations of the economy we discuss the steady state solutions. Using the first order conditions (3.1) -(3.2) and (3.8) -(3.12) we can derive the steady state values for the skeptic and climate aware policy makers respectively. The steady state for the skeptic case has a closed-form expression and is fairly straightforward. Finding the steady state for the climate-aware policy maker is harder, as there are no analytical first-order conditions. We can simplify (3.8) -(3.12).
Then using a Newton-Rhapson method we find steady state values that minimize the differences between the left-side and the right-side of these conditions which must hold in the steady state. The resulting steady-state values for state and control variables (for both types of policy-makers) are presented in table 2. Note that the steady state for the climate-aware policy maker is many decades into the future, as it will take a while for the climate system to get to a new equilibrium. Meanwhile if we assume the skeptics are right, then we are already in the steady state because temperature is a random variable.
Recall that we assumed in our calibration that the current policy is a skeptic one. 
Skeptic Policymaker
For the skeptic policy maker we used projection analysis to obtain a best approximation of the optimal consumption at each level of capital and global temperature. The resulting approximation is the following second-order polynomial function:
Hence consumption increases with current capital stock and decreases with survival probability. The scale effect is behind the positive relationship between capital and consumption. More capital results in more production and hence more consumption. On the other hand when catastrophe probability increases, the effective discount factor decreases, leading the policymaker to consume more now and leave less capital for the future years.
To ilustrate te solution above we ploted impulse response functions, showing how the economy reacts to a single standard deviation temperature shock in the first period, with the initial economy in the steady state. The IRF plots are presented in figures 2 - Trillion) and higher temperatures (over 6 degrees above current levels). The surprising conclusion from these simulations is that even a completely skeptic policy does not result in runaway climate change. Though some climate change occurs, it eventually hits fairly high temperature values but stabilizes. Of course there is still significant welfare loss present, which will be discussed further in the Welfare Comparison section below.
A key assumption that arguably drives this result is that capital is worthless after the catastrophe. This creates incentives for the skeptic to consume rather than invest in capital as catastrophe probability increases, hence scaling back capital and emissions. The logic behind that assumption is that the catastrophe drastically decreases productivity, and destroys significant amounts of existing capital, resulting in a new low-capital and low-consumption post catastrophe steady state. For computational simplicity we don't model the transition path between the time of the catastrophe and the new steady state and assume it happens instantaneously. In reality however, there is a period between the catastrophe and the new equilibrium, during which the consumption and capital paths are highly dependent on the ammount of capital accumulated before the catastrophe.
Whether the prospect of increased consumption during this "intermittent" period is sufficient for the skeptic to accumulate capital (and hence increase emissions), it is hard to say without doing rigorous analysis of the problem. If we were to speculate, we would say that relaxing this crucial assumption may reduce the downward pressure on capital but not remove it entirely. As long as the value of the post-catastrophe steady state capital is low enough 3 , that will dominate the analysis, leading the skeptic to reduce capital prior to the catastrophe. We leave the rigorous analysis of this more complicated problem for further studies.
Climate-Aware Policymaker
The solution of the climate-aware policymaker's problem, obtained using a value function iteration algorithm is the best approximation of the value function. As the form of the approximation is fairly complex we don't present the expression here. Using the obtained approximation we preformed montecarlo simulations of a climate-aware policymaker by finding the optimal consumption and fossil fuel at each point in time. The plots, representing average values of 100 montecarlo simulations are presented in 8 -11. The biggest difference between the skeptic and climate-aware policymakers is in the fossil fuel emis-sions. As can be seen in Figure 10 the climate-aware policymaker emits around 90 percent less than a skeptic one (around 4.6 ppmv compared to 42 ppmv)With fewer emissions the marginal productivity of capital decreases, so the climate-aware policymaker spends his savings, decreasing capital ( Figure 9 ). With less capital available and less fossil fuels burned, less can be consumed, so consumption decreases as well (Figure 8 . Eventually an equilibrium is reached where capital is $173 Trillion consumption is $222 Trillion and emissions are 4.4 ppmv. Note that relative to the skeptic behavior in the face of man made climate change, long-run consumption and capital are slightly higher while emissions are 90% lower. As a result of the dramatic emission cuts very little climate change occurs less than 1 degree, 3.5 degrees lower than the long-run skeptic temperature for a fully skeptic policymaker when facing man made climate change ( Figure 11 ).
The intuition behind the climate-aware policy maker's behavior is fairly straightforward -he reduces emissions to avoid the catastrophic climate change. Burning less fossil fuels reduces production, scaling back the economy and reducing capital and consumption.
We also simulated the optimal climate-aware policy function under the random climate change scenario (i.e. if the skeptics are right). We don't present the simulation plots here as they are fairly similar to the ones under man-made climate change. The climate-aware policymaker believes climate change is real, so he cuts fossil fuel emissions by scaling down production. In the random climate scenario the shocks can be persistent so temperature sometimes reaches much higher values. In these cases, the policymaker cuts emissions even lower, and increases consumption to match a decrease in fossil fuel with a decrease in capital. Once temperatures go back down, capital and emissions are restored back to the steady state.
Mixed Expectations -Policymakers with Moderate Skepticism Levels
The two cases presented in the previous sections are extremes -belief that climate change is man-made for sure, and a belief that human activity has no effect on our climate.
In reality most people and policy-makers are somewhere in the middle -moderately skeptic. Thus it is worth examining the optimal policy of a policy maker who believes that climate change is man-made with a certain probability π s k ∈ (0, 1). The problem of a moderately skeptic policy-maker is already outlined in Section 2, with the equation for evolution of climate expressed in (2.5). We derive the solution for policy makers with skeptic probability levels π s k = .1, .2 . . . .9. The solutions were then simulated for the same initial values, for both man-made climate change and random climate change scenarios.
We summarize the results of optimal behavior for moderate levels of skepticism with emission and temperature paths for each level of skepticism, simulated under the manmade climate change scenario (presented in Figures 12 and 13 respectively). As can be seen from the figures, the moderately-skeptic policy simulation results are much closer to the climate-aware policy simulation results. For skepticism levels below 60% annual emission levels are less than or equal to 5 ppm and final temperature change -between 1.5 and 2 degrees C. Furthermore, skepticism levels of 90 percent (corresponding to a 10 percent probability that climate change is connected to human activity) only results in emissions of 14 ppm and a final increase in temperature of 3.5 degrees. The intuition behind this result lies in the catastrophic nature of damages. Given a potential in climate catastrophe, a policy maker will do everything possible to avoid temperature rise beyond a certain level. Thus once temperature reaches a certain level, even a very low probability that curtailing emissions will lead to a reduction in temperature is enough for stringent action.
This result has some real-world application. Assume that a national policy-maker's view is representative of the views of the population. Then the 'skepticism-level' of a policy-maker corresponds to the proportion of the population that believe in man-made climate change. This result can than be used as an explanation of why nations where the majority of the population are skeptical about climate change (such as the United States), still pursue stringent environmental policy.
Welfare Comparison
As can be seen from our policy simulations, the completely skeptic policy maker has a higher initial level of consumption (in both scenarios) but the climate-aware one has less climate change (in the man-made climate change scenario). Using the expression in (2.8) we computed expected discounted social welfare for both optimal policies under both scenarios. To do so we used Monte-Carlo analysis running one thousand simulations for each scenario and calculating the average discounted social welfare The results are presented below in Table 3 .
As can be seen from the results, for the climate skeptic scenario the expected welfare of the skeptic is very close to that of the climate-aware policy maker. In the man-made climate change scenario however the welfare values are fairly different. The climate-aware policymaker dramatically cuts emissions and scales the economy back by reducing capital.
However, in the long run that policy results in less climate change and preserves a high level of consumption in the initial periods. The climate-skeptic policy maker on the other hand does not reduce emission, leading to much higher climate change (5.5 degrees C).
This increase in temperature increases the discount rate, leading to a scale back in the economy (which also mitigates climate change). However, the resulting mitigation is too small (as emissions are still fairly high) while consumption and capital end up being lower than in the skeptic case, due to the higher discount rate. As a result under the man-made climate change scenario the welfare of the climate-skeptic is significantly lower.
The main question we are trying to answer is what is the cost of skepticism. To find out, we compare the welfare loss of the two possible 'mistakes': picking the skeptic policy if the climate scientists are right versus picking the climate-aware one if the skeptics are right. The welfare loss of mistaken skepticism is 2.91 times as large as that of a mistaken belief in climate change. The conclusion we draw from this result is the following: given a choice between a completely skeptic policy or a completely environmentally stringent policy, any policy maker who believes there is more than 25 percent chance that climate change is real should prefer the latter.
To further determine how skepticism affects welfare, we examine welfare values for 
Conclusion
Despite overwhelming scientific evidence of man-made climate change, many policymakers are still skeptical about it. We study climate skepticism in a formal theoretical framework to determine how a skeptic policymaker responds to a potential climate catastrophe.
The climate catastrophe in question is an abrupt catastrophic event, which occurs at an uncertain time, and reduces all global consumption to a subsistence level. The probability of a catastrophic event increases with global temperature. Temperature is perceived as random by a fully skeptic policymaker and emission-driven by a climate aware one, while moderate skeptics assign probability values to each possibility.
We find that catastrophic climate change increases the effective discount rate in the climate skeptic case. Thus when the probability of catastrophe increases, the completely skeptic policymaker increases consumption, diminishing savings. These diminishing savings will in the long-run limit the consumption of the skeptic, decreasing fossil-fuel emis-sions and slowing down climate change. Thus, in face of a catastrophe, a completely skeptic policy does not lead to unlimited climate change.
On the other hand a climate-aware policy maker will scale back the economy right away, decreasing emissions and avoiding climate change almost entirely. The welfare loss of that scale-back is relatively small compared to the climate change resulting from a fully skeptic policy. Furthermore, the cost of unnecessary emission cuts incurred by the climate aware if the completely skeptic are right is much smaller than the climate change damages incurred by the completely skeptic if the climate-aware are right. Additionally, we find that due to catastrophic consequences of climate change, even policy-makers with low levels of belief in man-made climate change will implement a stringent environmental policy.
The overarching conclusion of this study is that potential catastrophic climate change damages lead to emission reduction regardless of the level of skepticism. Thus a potential application of this theoretical excercise would be that more effort should be focused on eductating the public on potential catastrophic damages of climate change. As long as the public is convinced that climate change leads to catastrophe they will support a stringent environmental policy regardless how skeptical they are of man-made climate change.
One key assumption onwhich the result is somewhat dependent is that capital is worthless immediately after the catastrophe as the world switches to subsistence consumption. It would be interesting to fully model post-catastrophe behavior, explicitly calculating the optimal transition from the pre-catastrophe accumulated capital to the eventual subsistence consumption steady state. With these dynamics in place there would be incentives for skeptics to increase production before the catastrophe. Do these incentives lead skeptics to generate unbounded climate change? We leave it to further studies to answer this question.
A Appendix

A.1 Projection Method Used to Solve the Skeptic Problem
The main idea behind projection analysis is to identify a function P (K t , T t ), which approximates the optimal consumptionĈ t . We begin by identifying a grid [
on which we want to approximate the optimal solution. In the skeptic expectations case, temperature only appears in the agent's utility functions as λ(T t ) hence it is reasonable to construct a grid on λ(T t ) rather than T t itself. We then pick a functional form for the approximation P (K t , λ t ). In this case we use a fairly simple we use a n-th order polynomial (but more complex functions may be used as well). Then for every
], the approximate optimal consumption level is specified by:
All that remains is to identify the coefficients g ij that give the closest approximation of optimal consumption. Let g = {g ij } i,j=1,...,n be a set of coefficients identifying an approximation of optimal consumption P g . Then, for each such coefficient set g we can compute Error(g) (a measure of how good our approximation is), by summing the difference between the left hand side and the right hand side of the Euler equation (defined in (3.6)) for each grid point.
The only complicating factor in computing Error(g) is the expectations operator.
However, because the stochastic component of the climate process is normally distributed, we can use Gaussian-Quadrature to numerically approximate expectation. Then we apply a Newton-Rhapson algorithm to find the coefficients g that minimize Error(g), and hence
give us the best approximation.
A.2 Value Function Iteration Method Used to Solve the Skeptic Problem
Our goal is to find a function V such that it is the fixed point of the following problem:
Approximating V around a steady state value would defeat the point as is often when solving IAMs the steady state is 100 years into the future, thus we need to know the optimal behavior far from the steady state. Purely grid-based methods (finding the optimal value for V at every point) would be too burdensome -with 3 state variables and 2 control variables plus 1 stochastic component, a fine grid would require too many grid points. Thus we turn towards a flexible function approximation of V . We still of course need a grid over which to fit the value function, but this grid can be a lot sparser with a flexible function form.
Let Φ(K t , S t , T t ; χ) be a family of functions, parameterized by vector χ. Then the closest approximation to V corresponds to some χ. There are many potential functional forms for Φ. We have at first tried to use a set of Chebyshev polynomials. However the best option turned out to be the following neural network approximation (same as the one used in Kelly and Kolstad (1999)):
χ 1l tanh(χ 2l K t + χ 3l S t + χ 4l λ(T t ) + χ 5l ) + χ 6 (A.3)
We used the following algorithm to find the set of parameters χ such that Φ(K t , S t , T t ; χ)
is the best approximation of V :
1. Create a grid. Pick a starting value for the value function V j0 at every grid point j.
2. Using a numerical solver find χ 0 such that it minimizes
3. At every grid point j find the optimal control C j and X j by maximizing
Ct,Xt U (C t ) + (1 − λ(T t )ψ + ρλ(T t )E(Φ(K t+1 , S t+1 , T t+1 ; χ 0 )) (A.5)
4. Find χ 1 by using a numerical solver to minimize j (Φ(K j S j T j ; χ 1 ) − V j,1 ) 2 (A.6) 5. Repeat steps 2-4, until max j |V j,i − V j,i−1 | < ζ (where ζ is some fixed convergence threshold).
The value function was approximated on a grid around the steady state, using a small grid of 10 points for each state variable (N = 1000 points total). To provide sufficient flexibility for the function it is suggested that the size of the parameter vector χ (5L+1)
should be around (N ) (where N is the total number of grid points). We set L = 6 for a total of 31 parameters.
A.3 Simulation Plots
A.3.1 Skeptic Optimal Policy Simulated for the Skeptic Scenario Figure 14: Welfare levels, computed by simulating the optimal policy for various levels of skepticism simulated for the man-made and random climate change scenarios. Welfare averaged over 100 simulation runs.
